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Use of Accident Reports to Impeach
In Carter v. Neims' a trial court permitted plaintiff's
counsel to impeach defendant's testimony by showing incon-
sistent statements contained in an accident report which
defendant had filed with the Division of Motor Vehicles
pursuant to Virginia Code § 46.1-400. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals summarily dismissed defendant's
objection to such use of the report because defendant had
failed to make timely objection.
This case and the subsequent federal court case of
Krizak v. W. C. Brooks & Sons, Inc.2 have completely ex-
ploded all notions that Virginia Code § 46.1-400 et seq.
afford absolute privilege to such reports. The cases parallel
each other factually, differing only in that defendant made
timely objection in the latter. The trial court overruled the
objection and the appellate court affirmed.
Krizak seems to suggest the rationale underlying the
summary dismissal in Carter. The Court distinguishes the
privilege afforded by Code § 46.1-4083 from the attorney-
client privilege and various other privileges saying that
Code § 46.1-4104 makes copies of the report available to
any party involved in the accident; thus, its contents are
not confidential in all respects. The Statute, therefore, pro-
vides only limited privilege-it merely precludes admission
of the report itself and does not prohibit using informa-
tion contained therein.
1 204 Va. 338, 131 S.E.2d 401 (1963).
2 902 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1963).
3 This section states that "No such report shall be used as evidence
in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident.. ."
4 Important parts of this section are as follows: But any report
of an accident made pursuant to ... § 46.1-407 and 46.1-408 shall
be open to the inspection of any person involved or injured in
the accident or as a result thereof, or his attorney; and provided,
further, that the Commissioner or Superintendent shall upon the
written request of any such person or attorney or any authorized
representative of any insurance carrier reasonably anticipating
exposure to civil liability.. .furnish a copy of any such report...
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Wigmore states that a number of modern statutes re-
quiring one to report certain matters to administrative of-
ficials have created privileges respecting such require-
ments. Since such privileges are mere creatures of statute,
one must look to the statute to define the limits of such
privilege. 5 The court in Krizak appears to have used this
method and in this respect the decision seems logically
sound. But such logic contains weakness in ignoring the
probable purpose of the statute.
Erhardt v. Rucn Transport Corp.6 discusses the Uniform
Act Regulating Traffic on Highways7 and states that such
statutes were passed to permit the highway department to
obtain accurate information concerning accidents. "It be-
comes evident", continues the court, "that to obtain such
information the source must be carefully guarded so that
no prejudice will result to the informant...."s
The Virginia statute, although more specific than the
Uniform Act, endeavors to fulfill a like purpose. But at-
tainment of such an end, however, under the Krizak inter-
pretation appears impossible, for few persons would give a
candid report of facts knowing that such statement could
be used against them. The court faced an obvious inter-
pretative dilemma: Should they interpret the Statute
strictly using the above Wigmore criterion and thus limit
its effectiveness, or should they interpret generally in order
to make the statute more effective? They interpreted *strict-
ly probably feeling that to do otherwise would be judicial
legislation.
5 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2377 (3rd Ed.) (1940). (McNaugh-
ton's rev. 1961).
6 245 Iowa 193, 61 N.W. 2d 696 (1953).
7 11 U.L.A. 18. All accident reports made to the department or
to any city department under local ordinance shall be without
prejudice, shall be for the information of such department and
shall not be open to public inspection. The fact that such reports
have been so made shall be admissible in evidence solely to prove a
compliance with this section, but no such report nor any part
thereof or statement contained therein shall be admissible in
evidence for any other purpose....
8 Ibid. note 6, p 701.
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Wigmore, however, states another general interpretative
criterion which might allow a more liberal interpretation
of the Statute. He states that "The injury that would inuke
to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation." Under this criterion, the
court could consider the overall purpose of the statute and,
thus, permit it to be an effective aid in the study of accident
prevention.
A more liberal interpretation by some method would
seem preferable, for otherwise, the statute will serve only
to encourage untruths.
J.F.P.
9 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2285 (3rd Ed.) (1940). (MeNaugh-
ton's rev. 1961).
